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**COMMAND AND CONTROL IN COALITION WARFARE:  
DOES HISTORY PROVIDE US WITH PRACTICABLE  
SOLUTIONS FOR TODAY?**

BY

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### **COMMAND AND CONTROL IN COALITION WARFARE: DOES HISTORY PROVIDE US WITH PRACTICABLE SOLUTIONS FOR TODAY?**

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## ABSTRACT

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The rapid changes in the world since the end of the Cold War have re-awakened interest in coalition warfare. Indeed, both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy see coalition warfare as the norm for the Armed Forces of the USA. The most contentious area in coalition warfare is the command and control arrangements. In particular, what authority will the coalition commander have; and the converse, what day to day control will national authorities have over the employment of their forces. The paper examines historical examples with particular emphasis on the two world wars. It notes that in WW1 that Unity of Effort proved insufficient under the pressures of March 1918 and examines the development of Unity of Command and integrated staffs in WW2. It then compares these lessons with current joint doctrine and notes that the emphasis today is on Unity of Effort and parallel command rather than Unity of Command. It concludes by questioning whether we have surrendered too easily the principle of Unity of Command.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL IN COALITION WARFARE: DOES HISTORY PROVIDE US WITH PRACTICABLE SOLUTIONS FOR TODAY?**

*What experience and history teaches us is this -  
that people and governments never learn anything from history,  
or have ever acted upon it (Hegel)*

The fundamental change in international relations resulting from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has re-awakened interest in coalition warfare. Unlike alliances which have an enduring element to them, coalitions are ad hoc, short term and for a specific objective<sup>1</sup>. This interest is reflected in both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS<sup>2</sup> makes a number of comments on the subject of multinational operations:

" We will act with others when we can."<sup>3</sup>

" In alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others."<sup>4</sup>

" Overseas Presence: Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, by improving our abilities to operate with other nations."<sup>5</sup>

The NMS<sup>6</sup> is equally specific: "While we maintain the unilateral capability to wage decisive campaigns to protect US and multi-national security interests, our Armed Forces will most often fight in concert with regional allies and friends, as coalitions can decisively increase combat power and lead to a more rapid and favourable outcome to the conflict"<sup>7</sup>. Since coalition operations will therefore be the most common method for the employment of US

forces, the necessary doctrine must be developed. This is already in hand, albeit at an early stage. The most contentious area of coalition operations is command and control. This concerns that most sensitive of areas; who will have command over the forces and what authority that commander will have; and the converse, what day to day control national authorities will have over the employment of their forces. This paper will examine the lessons of history, in particular the two World Wars, and compare them with current doctrine to discover whether the command and control of coalition operations today has applied those lessons.

It should not be thought that coalition warfare is new. It was the enduring feature of European wars throughout much of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, indeed the Napoleonic Wars are a graphic demonstration of the short term and ad hoc nature of coalition warfare. In this century the World Wars were between coalitions, as well as Korea (under the UN), Vietnam and most recently Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Even the Cold War caused nations with common interests to join together, although the enduring nature of the threat at the time and its necessary response caused alliances rather than coalitions to be formed. These were NATO, CENTO and SEATO, although the latter two had a much shorter life-span. Even in the Western Hemisphere, where the US could be perceived as wholly dominant within its 'back-yard', the political necessity of legitimacy has necessitated coalition operations in Grenada and Haiti (but under the UN), although the initial burden for the latter operation fell on the USA. However, it is the two World Wars that have had the greatest impact on our understanding of how coalition warfare can be conducted. There is in

effect almost a continuum from the very loose structures of 1914 through to the conclusion of the European War of World War 2 in May 1945, where the most developed coalition ever assembled achieved victory.

World War I was fought between two coalitions, the Central Powers (principally Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Turkey) and the Allies (principally France, Russia, UK and Italy). The command arrangements for much of the war were extremely loose, based on cooperation and coordination at the very best, with nations pursuing their own national goals for much of the time. Today such arrangements are described in Joint Pub 3-0 as parallel command arrangements: "Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists"<sup>8</sup>. It was only in 1918, when the Allies on the Western Front were staring defeat in the face, that more integrated arrangements were adopted.

The concept of parallel command therefore underpinned the command relationships for much of the war. Even on the Western Front where the British Army fought beside the much larger French Army, the command arrangements were national. On his assumption as CinC of the British Army in France in 1915, General Sir Douglas Haig was reminded by the War Minister, Lord Kitchener "Your command is an independent one and you will in any case not come under the orders of any allied general"<sup>9</sup>. However, Sir Douglas Haig had to command his Army within the reality of the high intensity operations of the Western Front

and rapidly came to a different conclusion. In 1915 he wrote "I am not under General Joffre's orders, but that would make no difference, as my intention was to do my utmost to carry out General Joffre's wishes on strategic matters as if they were orders"<sup>10</sup>. The arrival of the United States on the Western Front in 1917 saw no immediate change in attitude to the extant arrangements. General John J Pershing's directive from the Secretary of War stated "In operations against the Imperial German Government, you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in doing so the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved"<sup>11</sup>.

It was not until the near collapse of the Western Front in March 1918 resulting from the major German offensive that changes were made, and even they were not immediate. On March 26 1918 a Resolution was signed at Doullens which stated "General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments to coordinate the action of the Allied armies on the Western Front. To this end he will come to an understanding with the Commanders-in-Chief, who are to furnish him all the information necessary"<sup>12</sup>. Thus, although General Foch was established as a Supremo, he was given no authority. However, the continuing deterioration in the situation and further problems of coordination between the British and French Armies necessitated further action. On 3 April 1918 the Premiers of France and the United Kingdom, together with their senior military commanders and General John J Pershing of the USA met at Beauvais to review again the command arrangements. Having acknowledged that the Doullens Resolution had not achieved the desired result, the necessity

for Unity of Command was proposed by General Pershing and his words then are as apposite today: "The principle of unity of command is undoubtedly the correct one for the Allies to follow. I do not believe that it is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander. We have already experience enough in trying to coordinate the operations of the Allied Armies without success. There has never been real unity of action. Such coordination between two or three armies is impossible no matter who the commanders-in-chief may be. Each commander-in-chief is interested in his own army, and cannot get the other commander's point of view or grasp the problem as a whole. I am in favour of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the Allied cause depends upon it. I think the necessary action should be taken by this council at once. I am in favour of conferring the supreme command upon General Foch"<sup>13</sup>. His view was accepted and the Beauvais Agreement was signed stating: "General Foch is charged by the British, French and American Governments with the coordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front; to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the same end, the British, French and American Governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French and American Armies will exercise to the fullest extent tactical direction of their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his government, if in his opinion his army is placed in danger by the instructions received from General Foch"<sup>14</sup>. In the time available General Foch was only able to achieve a coordinating role, since his staff was smaller than that of a Brigade. However, the impact of the events of 1918 was profound, not in the immediate aftermath but in their influence on the Anglo-

American alliance of World War 2. World War I had seen the development of command and control from parallel command to unity of command with a Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, General Foch. The inability of coordination measures, even with a compliant British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, to cope with the demands of allied action against the rapidly changing situation in the spring of 1918, demonstrated that unity of command was a pre-requisite to effective allied war fighting.

However, it was World War 2 that saw the development of coalition warfare to its greatest level of integration and sophistication, but even then it was a gradual process. The Franco-British alliance of 1939-40 showed that some of the lessons of 1914-18 had been assimilated. A Supreme War Council was established consisting of the two Premiers, their Foreign Ministers and their senior military advisers. A system of lead nation based on preponderance of forces within a given theatre was established. In the Mediterranean Sea, the French led in the West and the British in the East with a French naval squadron under command. In France, Lord Gort the Commander of the BEF, reported to the French CinC via the Commander of French forces in NE France, General Georges. While this might appear to show the lessons of 1918 being put into practical effect, no real unity of command was established. Field Marshal Montgomery, then a Division Commander in the BEF wrote " .. between September 1939 and May 1940, the allies had never conducted any exercises, either with or without troops, (although) an indoor exercise on the model could easily have been held .... there was no coordination between the operations of the Belgians, the BEF, and the First French Army"<sup>15</sup>. The defeat of the French in the summer of 1940 and the

emergence of the Anglo-American Alliance in 1941-2 allowed a new approach to the problems of coalition warfare and the particular issue of command of coalition forces.

These issues appeared rapidly at the forefront of allied considerations within weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbor with the rapidly deteriorating situation in the East Indies, Philippines and Malaya. The need for a Supreme Commander in the theatre was raised by General Marshall at the Arcadia Conference in Washington who declared "that the adoption of unified command (in the theatre) would solve nine tenths of the problems of British-American cooperation"<sup>16</sup>. The resulting establishment of the ABDACOM (Australian, British, Dutch, American Command) under General Wavell firmly established the principle of unity of command from the very beginning of the new coalition; it was to prove fundamental to its success. The difficulties of agreeing the terms of reference and authority of the CinC of ABDACOM were profound. Early drafts were full of prohibitions and his final powers were very constrained. General Marshall stated "if the Supreme Commander ended up with no more authority than to tell Washington what he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an improvement over the present situation"<sup>17</sup>. Both sides appreciated the many failings of this initial attempt at establishing the authority of a coalition commander, but the die was cast in the acceptance of the principle of unity of command. It can be no accident that the proponent of this was General Marshall, who had been General Pershing's chief staff officer from 1917-24. He had witnessed at first hand the tribulations of allied command in 1918.

The difficulties of the two allies to come to a common view and understanding of the principles of command should not be underestimated, since their approach was diametrically different. Both accepted the need for a coordinated higher direction of the war, ie to refine grand strategy, and the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington was the result. However, theatre command and the authority vested in that commander was another matter. The British regarded service chiefs within a theatre as co-equals (a committee) and Churchill required close supervision of his commanders, doubtless born out of the many failings of British generalship in the early part of the war: "It is not sufficient to give a general a directive to beat the enemy and wait and see what happens. The matter is much more complicated. The general may well be below the level of his task, and has often been found so. A definite measure of guidance and control is required from the staffs and from the high government authorities"<sup>18</sup>. The American tradition favoured a broad delegation of responsibility and authority to a commander, on the principle that he should be assigned a job, given the means to do it and held responsible for its fulfilment without scrutiny of the measures employed<sup>19</sup>. The decision to carry out a combined landing in North Africa in late 1942 drew the issue of allied command to the fore. Fortunately, the American view prevailed and General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander for Operation Torch. General Marshall advised him that "it is the desire of the War Department that you as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces should have the maximum feasible degree of authority and responsibility, and that you should operate at all times under as broad a directive as possible"<sup>20</sup>. Whatever the difficulties, and they had been significant, by the time of the first real coalition operation, Operation Torch, the principle of unity of command and

a supreme allied commander for a theatre had been established. However, recognizing that this was the first time that a British Army had served under a US Commander, General Andersen the Commander of 1st (British) Army was given the right of appeal [subject to some constraints] to national authorities if he felt his army was threatened with dire consequences. While this right of appeal was in principle retained throughout the war, it was seldom exercised. Allied unity of command was confined to the Western Mediterranean and later the Western European and South East Asian theatres. Elsewhere, for example the Eastern Mediterranean and the Pacific, the old principle of lead nation remained, since these were either single nation areas, or at least one heavily dominated by one nation. It could be argued that a greater level of unity of command and integration of forces was achieved in the coalition forces in Europe than in the US dominated Pacific, even up to the projected invasion of Japan.

'Unity of Command' in the Anglo-American alliance had a particular meaning, distinct from the natural authority implicit in the term 'command'. Richard Leighton<sup>21</sup> in his study stated "... it implies special arrangements to bring together under a single commander elements ordinarily controlled by separate sources of authority each 'sovereign' within its own sphere ..... Invariably the powers of the joint commander have been closely hedged about by restrictions designed to preserve the direct chain of command from the central authority of the service or nation to its own commanders in the field"... "Allied unified command was always primarily concerned with control of forces rather than territory, and it shunned as far as possible the administrative jurisdiction which was inseparable from

territorial control"<sup>22</sup>. However, despite such restrictions on the scope of the authority of an allied commander exercising unity of command, it should not be presumed that he lacked authority. Quite the reverse, it was in the final instance General Eisenhower's decision alone to launch 'Overlord' and 'Market Garden', and to pursue a broad front strategy in Western Europe.

For an allied commander to exercise his authority he required a headquarters staff, a tool Marshall Foch lacked in 1918. The AFHQ for Torch was a new and unique structure since it was a fully integrated combined staff. It reflected there being a US Commander and Chief of Staff, with British component commanders. Its genesis was almost certainly the combined planning staff that General Eisenhower assembled in London to plan Torch and who accompanied him to AFHQ. Back in England, the COSSAC staff under Lieutenant General Morgan charged with the planning of Overlord had to operate under a system of 'opposite numbers' until General Eisenhower arrived in January 1944 and insisted on an integrated combined staff. The AFHQ for Torch was criticized for its large size, and the difficulties of matching two different staff systems and nationalities should not be underestimated. But it was achieved and matured as the war progressed. The lessons of Operations Torch, Husky and the subsequent invasion of Italy all contributed to the final allied command and staff structures for Overlord. In particular, command of allied air forces especially the strategic bombers supporting the theatre operation, and the land component command residing with Eisenhower. As a result, SHAEF was initially a combined army staff, with joint input coming from collocated component planning staffs, and on occasion the

full air and naval component staffs. Later on following the invasion, an Air Staff was assembled to support Air Marshal Tedder as the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief.

It is indeed fortunate for allied cooperation that General Eisenhower was the man selected by General Marshall, and subsequently accepted by both the United States and Britain as the man to lead the allied forces in Europe. By the manner in which he discharged his duties he has become the epitome of the successful Supreme Allied Commander. It is hard to imagine Generals Patton or Montgomery in such an appointment. The characteristics required by an Allied Commander are set out in a letter from General Eisenhower to Admiral Mountbatten on the latter's notification that he was to assume command of SEAC: "The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theatre. Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field. This is true if for no other reason than no commander of an allied force can be given complete administrative and disciplinary powers over the whole command. It will therefore never be possible to say the problem of establishing unity in any allied command is ever completely solved. This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential"<sup>23</sup>. General Eisenhower's influence was felt not only in the manner in which he conducted himself as the Supreme

Allied Commander but also in his headquarters, first AFHQ in the Mediterranean and then SHAEF in NW Europe. With the exception of having his own Chief of Staff, he placed no weight on any particular structure or organizational method within the existing G1-4 framework, which he regarded as mere detail. Instead, he placed the emphasis on the characteristics required of good staff officers: confidence, logic and loyalty.

World War 2 saw the development of coalition warfare to a peak never passed before or since. The principle of unity of command was firmly established, as well as unity of purpose at the grand strategic level. The task was certainly made simpler by the two principle allies speaking the same language and sharing a common culture and common values. This was complicated later in General Devers' 6 Army Group when the French were included. On the other hand, the Commanders had in many cases been promoted rapidly up the ranks reflecting the needs of the large wartime armies and the staffs were mainly hostilities only officers with limited troop and staff experience. In concluding this examination of World War 2 coalition command, the thoughts on allied command by two senior United States officers are particularly apposite:

General Devers (Cdr 6 Army Group) listed the principal problems facing an Allied Theatre Commander: "Characteristic lack of clarity and firmness of directives received from the next superior combined headquarters or authority; the conflicting political, economic, and military problems and objectives of each allied power; the logistical capabilities, organization, doctrines, and characteristics of each armed forces

under command; personal intervention and exercise of a direct, personal influence to assure coordination and success in the initial phases of the mission assigned by the next higher authority; the personality of the senior commanders of each of the armed services of the allied powers under command, their capabilities, personal and professional habits, and their ambitions."<sup>24</sup>

Maj General Harold R Bull USA ( Ch Plans SHAEF):

"I can truly testify from my own experience that solving the problem of combined command in war is simpler and more expeditious than solving the joint problems in our national defense establishment in peace."

(In the context of future combined operations involving potentially numerous participants): "I can conceive of no scheme which will work unless three actions are taken: First firm political decisions made and clear objectives set by national leaders above the theatre commander. That is to ensure unity of purpose. That I think is awfully important. If your international high level decisions are to be made at theatre level, I'd say, 'God help us in unity of purpose'; (second) Unity of Command to ensure unquestioned and timely execution of directives; (third) Staff integration with mutual respect and confidence in combined staffs to ensure sound development of plans and directives fully representing the interests of the major elements of the command."<sup>25</sup>

There have been many coalition operations since World War 2 involving the United States though none have achieved a command relationship that matched the level of sophistication and integration that the Allies had achieved by 1945. Korea was the first major commitment of US Forces since 1945. The war was fought under the auspices of the UN, but the command structure at theatre level reflected the domination and size of commitment by the United States. There were numerous national contingents but the US exercised the command function as lead nation. Given the speed with which the operation had to be established, it was inevitable that a lead nation concept was adopted. In the war in Vietnam, with the exception of the Australian and New Zealand forces which were in effect under the operational control of the US, the command structure seemed to take a step back in time to World War 1, prior to the Beauvais Agreement. And this despite the concentration of the war fighting in the US and South Vietnamese forces. A parallel command structure was adopted which was even stretched to include the South Koreans. This command relationship was criticized by General Bruce Palmer Jr in his book, *The 25 Year War*: "In retrospect I believe that the advantages of having US commanders exercise operational control over other national forces, especially South Vietnamese, would have far outweighed the draw backs, for the fact is that we did not generate our best combined efforts. As a minimum we should have insisted on having a substantive voice in the selection, promotion, and removal of key South Vietnamese Commanders"<sup>26</sup>.

The operation to liberate Kuwait, Operation Desert Storm, achieved a marked improvement on the command arrangements for Vietnam but still did not achieve unity of

command. Instead, CINCENT strove to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort. An interesting hybrid command relationship was established which was both parallel and lead nation, the US leading the western nations' forces and the Saudi Arabians the Arabs'. However, even then it was abundantly clear to all that the US was in the lead for both campaign development, and conduct of the campaign once hostilities began. Given the lack of unity of command, a new structure was born, the Coalition Coordination, Communications and Integration Center (C3IC). This had neither overall command authority nor a direct role in the campaign planning process. However, it did formalize coordination and liaison arrangements between the leaders and staffs of the leaders of the two blocks, the USA and Saudi Arabia. Its role is best described in the article 'Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm': "It is important to note that the C3IC did not command any units. The C3IC advised the separate commanders and their staffs, and it transmitted orders of one national command chain to the other. The C3IC integrated the effort of both parties into a unity of effort, not a unity of command"<sup>27</sup>. While these arrangements suited the particular circumstances of Desert Storm, it should not be assumed that they will necessarily apply in the future. The coalition enjoyed overwhelming force, the objective was limited and clearly achievable in a short period of time, so any shortfalls in these arrangements, if there are any, had little opportunity to be exposed. Operations involving greater risk, increased opportunities for deviation from the agreed mission or longer duration may well see coalition partners seeking greater representation among the headquarters staff that is planning the operation they will conduct. The C3IC does not fill that need. But with that desire from coalition partners may well come a parallel demand from the coalition leader for greater unity of command.

What of current US doctrine on coalition C2? Both Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations and its child, Joint Pub 3-16<sup>28</sup>, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations propose three possible command arrangements for Coalition Operations: parallel, lead nation, or a combination of the two as established for Operation Desert Storm. Joint Pub 3-0 notes that parallel command is the "easiest to organize and often the organization of choice". It also observes when discussing lead nation command that "lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership". Emphasis is also placed on achieving unity of effort since it is assumed that unity of command by definition is not achievable under parallel command. Joint Pub 3-16 states that a lead-nation command arrangement will achieve unity of command, though how is not explained. It notes "Unity of command established early on facilitates unity of effort. However, nations are generally reluctant to grant extensive control of their forces to one lead nation"<sup>29</sup>. It also proposes augmenting the headquarters staff with representatives of the participating coalition members. It does not propose integration of staffs. It offers no further guidance on which may be a more preferable command relationship, nor notes the strengths and weaknesses of each. The Army Publication FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations<sup>30</sup>, also proposes that parallel command is often the organization of choice, but notes that "While other command arrangements emerge as the coalition matures, the parallel model is often the starting point"; a sensible conclusion.

Chapter VI (Multinational Operations) of Joint Pub 3-0 discusses at some length the concept of unity of effort, but does not even mention unity of command, despite it being a

US principle of war. Unity of command is defined today as: "The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose"<sup>31</sup>. Has the principle of unity of command for multinational operations been dismissed too easily in favour of unity of effort? Coalitions, as discussed earlier, are an ad hoc grouping of nations who have a common objective, ie a unity of purpose. They are willing partners in the enterprise ready to sacrifice, if necessary, their servicemen in the pursuit of this objective. The examples of unity of command in World War 2 have shown that coalition unity of command can be very constrained, witness General Marshall's comments on General Wavell for ABDACOM.

Also, the success of allied unity of command rested not so much on regulation but on mutual confidence, which admittedly took time to develop. However, today confidence does benefit from NATO membership and the associated Partnership for Peace, recent operations and multinational exercising. A coalition commander has always had to, and will continue to operate within constraints. Providing that these are made clear to him from the outset by contributing nations, he should in general be able to operate within them. A US Joint Task Force commander is no different in having to operate within the constraints imposed by existing doctrine (for example no integration of logistics) or by the overall Joint Force Commander, it is a matter of degree. Coalition unity of command requires there to be one person in command, to whom coalition partners owe unswerving obedience, but within the constraints established for their employment.

A common feature of recent coalition and UN operations is the very constrained delegation of command authority from national authorities. The US has made great play recently over the fact that command will not be delegated to a non-US commander, although OPCON may be delegated to a competent alliance or coalition commander. Under existing NATO agreements for Article V operations, OPCOMD was passed to SACEUR or SACLANT by national authorities. However, the new NATO doctrine publication AJP-1 recognises that for many operations today nations will only delegate OPCON, since they wish to ensure that the appointed commander has no scope to change the mission nor authority to adjust national government constraints as expressed in national ROE. In fact even the expectation of OPCON may be more than is achieved. The UK and France, both in the Gulf War and in Bosnia have only delegated TACON. Indeed, recent experience is that even an accepted command state may well come with a number of constraints.

Having examined the development of command arrangements at theatre level, consideration must also be given to arrangements within the components. These will be different within each component, as forces that are contributed to a component vary both in their size and complexity. The ground component has invariably been the most difficult to integrate, because of doctrinal and equipment differences that impact even at the unit level. In World War 2, the allies did not plan to integrate below Corps level, although Divisions were exchanged occasionally for a short duration. In Korea many nations sent battalion groups that had to integrated into US Regimental Combat Teams, often at significant cost to the US since they were inadequately supported logistically. Following the debacle at the

Imjin River, the UK withdrew its brigade from US divisional command and together with other Commonwealth forces established the Commonwealth Division. Until recently in NATO, integration did not occur below division level, but this reflected heavy divisions in high intensity operations. In Low Intensity conflict, where soldiers may not discharge their basic load of ammunition during a 6 month duty, there may be greater scope for integrating battalions within a multinational brigade.

Naval forces have in many respects achieved a level of integration unmatched amongst the services. Most navies subscribe to the Composite Warfare Commander Concept whereby responsibility is delegated to a specific commander for a particular discipline such as Anti-surface warfare or Anti-aircraft warfare. This has allowed the assembly of multinational task groups as seen in the NATO Standing Naval Forces and in the Gulf War. In addition, as a result of the larger NATO navies exercising with many other nation's navies during their worldwide deployments, NATO doctrine and procedures have become almost the common currency in multinational maritime operations. Command arrangements for naval operations are also to an extent simplified by the limited number of ships, and that each ship is a self-contained unit, albeit with a significant logistic liability.

Unity of air effort is best achieved when command and control is exercised from the highest practicable level by a designated commander<sup>32</sup>. The success of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept during Desert Storm has proved a system that is capable of commanding an air operation whatever the aircraft's origin. The JFACC concept

is capable of employing any aircraft that is offered for tasking provided that its characteristics match the requirements of the planned missions. As with the naval component, NATO procedures have again provided a common procedural basis for multi-national operations.

In conclusion, "The fundamental purpose of combined military command is to direct the massed military effort of a coalition of nations toward the accomplishment of commonly accepted objectives in the areas for which such a command has been designated"<sup>33</sup>. The lessons of both World Wars have provided clear models of how coalition command arrangements should be arranged to achieve the purpose described above. Unity of command and integrated staffs were at the heart of the successful allied commands in World War 2. Unity of effort was inadequate to cope with the demands of the German offensives in spring 1918 and summer 1940. Yet despite these lessons, we appear to have surrendered too easily the principle of unity of command and the integrated command structures that naturally flow from it. The two world wars have demonstrated unity of effort to be a poor substitute for unity of command when the situation deteriorates. Command structures and relationships to support unity of command must be established from the outset. They are not easily constructed under pressure when operational reverses are being experienced. Is unity of command so hard to achieve? Coalitions are accepted by many countries today as the norm for military action, since they provide legitimacy for actions, reduce costs and the sharing of the burden may bring particular skills or capabilities lacking in one particular nation. When compared with the United States and the United Kingdom in 1941, who shared a common

language but little else, certainly not common doctrine or even experience of training together, the position of many countries today is immeasurably better. NATO has by default provided a common doctrine, operating procedures and experience of combined training and combined staffs. This is not only among its principal membership but these standards are also permeating wider to those who aspire to membership, principally those who have joined Partnership for Peace. In many other countries there is a commonality of equipment and the principal western states train many other nations forces as well as exercising with them. These all contribute towards the potential cohesion of coalitions, the bedrock of which is trust. This was the strength of the allied unity of command in World War 2. Should it not contribute equally today, in supporting the principle of unity of command for coalition warfare?

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## END NOTES

1. Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, VI-1: Alliances and Coalitions are defined as follows:
  - a. Alliance. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, longterm objectives.
  - b. Coalition. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
2. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (The White House February 1995).
3. Ibid, ii.
4. Ibid, 7.
5. Ibid, 9.
6. US Government Printing Office, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995. A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office).
7. Ibid, 13.
8. Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, VI-6.
9. John Terraine, "Lessons of Coalition War," RUSI Journal (September 1989): 57-62.
10. Ibid.
11. General John J Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, vol.1 (Da Capo Press 1995), 38.
12. Ibid, 374.
13. Ibid, 375
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